




We study how shareholdings aﬀect auctions’ revenue and eﬃciency with indepen-
dent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: Vertical (resp: hori-
zontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller’s proﬁt
(resp: a share of their competitor’s proﬁt). The expected revenue is an increasing
(resp : decreasing) function of vertical (resp : horizontal)toeholds. With both types of
toeholds, auction formats are not revenue equivalent. The second price auction is more
sensitive than the ﬁrst-price auction to the revenue variations upwards or downwards
due to these toeholds.
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11 Introduction
We study how shareholdings and cross-shareholdings aﬀect ﬁrms behaviors in an auction
context. But ﬁrst, let us illustrate why shareholdings can matter in an auction framework
through two cases.
The Global One case. Global One was a joint-venture created in 1996 by Deutsche
Telekom (40%), France T´ el´ ecom (40%) and Sprint (20%). In 1999, in order to satisfy com-
petition rules, Sprint was forced to sell its shares of Global One. Because of a former
agreement, the two remaining ex-partners were the only possible buyers for Sprint’s shares.
Neither of the two European companies accepted to stay with 40% of Global One while the
other owned 60%. The former partners agreed that they had to choose a selling process
such that, at the end, only one of the European operators would hold 100% of Global One.
The three ﬁrms considered using an auction process.1 The situation was slightly diﬀerent
from a standard auction setting. In the Global One case, the bidders, France T´ el´ ecom and
Deutsche Telekom, were wearing two hats. They were, in the same time, potential buyers of
the remaining shares and potential sellers of their own shares. The speciﬁcity of this setting
is the existence of this seller hat. We intend to study the impact of this extra seller hat.
In the Global One case, bidders owned, ex ante, a fraction of the good for sale. This is not
the only situation in which shareholdings aﬀect strategic incentives in an auction framework.
We also observe situations in which bidders own a fraction of the capital of other bidders.
This can also be a major issue. We illustrate that point through the presentation of a second
case.
RVI and Volvo Trucks were two of the main European truck manufacturers. Between
1991 and 1994, they had symmetric crossholdings of 45%. Meanwhile, in some European
countries, their joint market share exceeded 50%. Nevertheless, during that period, they still
regularly competed with each other in tenders organized by the major haulage companies
of these countries. Once again, one can wonder how these toeholds inﬂuenced the strategic
behaviors of RVI and Volvo Trucks in the tender stages. As a matter of fact, each of the
truck manufacturer got back a fraction of the proﬁt of the other. Thus, if RVI lost a market,
he preferred Volvo Trucks to obtain it and to make the highest possible proﬁt with this
tender.
In both cases, Global One and RVI/Volvo Trucks, because of these toeholds, bidders,
conditional on losing the auction, care about the price paid by the winner. We intend to
understand how this aﬀects bidders’ strategies. Do shareholdings have consequences on the
eﬃciency or the expected revenue of the auction? Do they have the same impact on the
diﬀerent auction formats? Which of the standard auction formats is preferable in these
cases? What is the optimal auction format? This paper addresses these issues.
1The author spoke with the Finance director of France T´ el´ ecom before the choice of the auction process.
Results of the current paper were evoked. The auction format that was eﬀectively used remained secret.
2We consider two types of toeholds. When a bidder owns shares of the seller or a fraction
of the object for sale2 as in the Global One case, we speak of a vertical toehold. When a
bidder owns shares of another bidder, we speak of an horizontal toehold.3 We study how both
types of toeholds aﬀect the revenue and the eﬃciency of auction formats in an independent
private value setting in the ﬁrst price auction and the second price auction.4 We also propose
an optimal auction format with horizontal toeholds.
The issue of toeholds in an auction context has been the object of several studies. More
speciﬁcally, Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) can be reinterpreted as a study of an auction with
vertical toeholds.5 In this context, he showed that the expected price is higher with a second
price auction than with a ﬁrst price auction.6 He considered that this result unbalances
Myerson’s Revenue Equivalence Theorem (see Myerson (1981)). In fact, proposition 3 is a
reformulation of this result7. However, we show, through our proof of this proposition, that,
on the contrary, this result can be interpreted as a consequence of the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem. The use of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem even allows to better understand
the origins and consequences of the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst price auction and the second
price auction. Regarding the horizontal toeholds case, Dasgupta and Tsui (2004) contains
results very close to ours8.
The speciﬁcity of our contribution consists in extending the horizontal toehold case (and
to a lesser extent the vertical toehold case) mainly by the identiﬁcation of the optimal auction
format and the extension to the n bidders case and in the joint analysis of the two types of
toeholds which allows to identify the qualitative diﬀerences between them. We show that
horizontal toeholds cannot be interpreted as negative vertical toeholds. As a matter of fact,
a losing bidder owning a vertical toehold only cares about the price paid by the winner. A
losing bidder owning an horizontal toehold cares about the price paid by the winner but he
also cares about the winner’s valuation for the good. Besides, the joint analysis of both types
of toeholds allows to have a general interpretation of the results in terms of the sensitivity
of auction formats. Let us be more precise and introduce the results.
Firstly, neither vertical toeholds, nor horizontal toeholds, as long as they are symmetric,
2Both events are conceptually identical.
3A toehold is not consubstantially horizontal or vertical. The context determines whether the toehold is
horizontal or vertical.
4Here, the two other standard auction formats, the descending and the ascending auction are equivalent
to the ﬁrst price auction and second price auction, respectively.
5His original motivation comes from Amish estate sales. After the death of a member of the community,
the farm is auctioned among the heirs and the resulting revenue is split among them.
6This result is also used in Maasland and Onderstal (2006) and Engers and McManus (2004). Indepen-
dently from this work, they both developed a related framework which can also be interpreted in terms of
vertical toeholds.
7Let us also mention that propositions 1 and 2 are corollaries of this work which considers a more general
setting.
8They obtain in a framework with reserve price and independent private signals results equivalent to
propositions 5, 6 and 7.
3aﬀect eﬃciency. Secondly, toeholds do have an impact on the expected revenue of auctions.
In both formats, vertical toeholds raise the expected revenue and horizontal toeholds decrease
it. Thirdly, these variations are exacerbated under the second price auction relative to the
ﬁrst price auction. When bidders have vertical toeholds, the expected revenue is larger under
a second price auction than under a ﬁrst price auction. When toeholds are horizontal, the
expected revenue is smaller under the second price auction than under the ﬁrst price auction.
Therefore, which auction format among the ﬁrst price and the second price auction generates
more revenue depends on the type of toehold considered.
The intuition is as follows. When bidders own shares of the seller of the good, they get
back, through their shares, a fraction of the amount given to the seller. For both bidders, this
is true whether they win or lose the auction. Then, in both auction formats, bidders tend
to bid more aggressively and the expected price is higher than without toeholds. However,
a losing bidder can have a direct impact on the price only in a second price auction. Then,
bidders have an extra incentive to be aggressive with the second price auction. That is why
the expected price is higher with a second price auction than with a ﬁrst price auction.
When bidders have crossholdings, we observe the opposite phenomenon. If a bidder does
not obtain the good, he prefers the price to be low. Suppose that bidder i owns a fraction
of bidder j. If bidder i loses the auction, he prefers that bidder j pays the lowest possible
price. This gives incentives to bid less aggressively than without toeholds. Consequently,
with both auction formats, the expected price is lower than in the standard case without
toeholds. Once again, a losing bidder can have a direct impact on the price only in a second
price auction. Because of this more direct leverage, bidders decrease their bids more strongly9
in a second price auction than in a ﬁrst price auction. Thus, the expected revenue is lower
with the second price auction than with the ﬁrst price auction.
As we already mentioned, the impact of shareholdings has already been discussed in
the auction theory literature. Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) and de Frutos and
Kittsteiner (2006) study a case of vertical toeholds in which the whole target ﬁrm is owned, ex
ante, by asymmetric competitors. They consider the eﬃciency issue. In their framework, the
question of the auction revenue does not make much sense. Once the allocation of the good
is determined, there are only transfers between the bidders. There is no actual sale price.
In another vein, Singh (1998) and Burkart (1995) analyze a contested takeover in which one
bidder owns a vertical toehold in the target ﬁrm. He faces a bidder without toehold. They
observe overbiddings and ineﬃciencies deriving from the asymmetry among bidders. They
do not study the equilibrium of the ﬁrst price auction, extremely diﬃcult to compute in
this case. Thus, we do not know if our ranking can be applied to their asymmetric setting.
Goeree et al (2005) studies charity sales in which the taste for the ﬁnanced public good
is equivalent to a vertical toehold. They mainly focus on all-pay auctions and introduce
9In comparison with the bids they would have submitted if there were no horizontal toeholds.
4an optimal auction format. Our approach of the optimal auction format with horizontal
toeholds can be seen as a complement to their approach. Bulow, Huang and Klemperer
(1999) also considers vertical toeholds but in a common value framework. They argue that
the common value paradigm is more appropriate to represent ﬁnancial bidders. In that
sense, their approach is complementary to ours in which we consider strategic10 bidders.
In their common value framework, they also observe that the revenue of the second price
auction is higher than the revenue of the ﬁrst price auction when toeholds are symmetric.
Our approach is also reminiscent of some aspects of the study of auctions with exter-
nalities initiated by Jehiel and Moldovanu. In Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000), for instance,
they consider an asymmetric information setting in which a losing bidder derives a positive
or negative ﬁxed externality from the allocation of the good to another bidder. A priori,
our vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds could be assimilated to a negative (resp: positive)
externality. However, what really matters here is that the externality term depends on the
price. This speciﬁc issue does not appear in the auction with externalities literature while
our comparison of the ﬁrst price auction and the second price auction crucially relies on it.
That is why, they observe a revenue equivalence between the main standard auction formats
while we do not obtain this equivalence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
In section 3, we analyze the impact of vertical toeholds. In section 4, we study the horizontal
toehold case. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
A good is sold through an auction process with two risk-neutral bidders, 1 and 2. Bidders 1
and 2 perfectly represent the interests of ﬁrms 1 and 2, respectively.11 Firm i’s valuation12
for the good is vi which is bidder i’s private information13. It is common knowledge that
10For a discussion on the diﬀerence between a strategic and a ﬁnancial bidder, see the introduction of
Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999). In short, A ﬁnancial bidder buys shares of companies in order to
sell them later so that he cares about the common value component of the target ﬁrm. A strategic bidder
buys ﬁrms in order to merge with this ﬁrm and to realize synergies. A strategic bidder cares more about the
private value component of the target ﬁrm.
11In the rest of the paper, we will identify bidders with the ﬁrms they represent.
12Throughout paper, by default i = 1,2 and j 6= i.
13We consider the independent private value paradigm in order to identify eﬀects that are speciﬁcally
due to the presence of toeholds Our results are independent from the eﬀect of aﬃliation and the explosive
impact of asymmetry in a common value framework as identiﬁed in Bulow et al (1999). Besides, in the two
introductive examples, the private value hypothesis seems justiﬁed. As a matter of fact, in the RVI/Volvo
Trucks case, players’ private information concerns their production costs whom they almost perfectly know
and which does not give them more information about the speciﬁc production costs of their opponents. In
the Global One case, of course, an important fraction of the value of the good is common among the two
buyers. However, we claim that the residual private information of the bidders concerns the independent
and private part of their valuations : private synergies, long-run industrial strategies... The common value
part of Global One is known by both bidders who have access to all the information concerning the ﬁrm and
5v1 and v2 are independently distributed according to an identical cumulative distribution F
with density f on the interval [0,1]. We further assume that F is continuous, diﬀerentiable,




on all the interval).
We deﬁne two categories of toeholds. A bidder has an horizontal toehold when he owns
a fraction of the capital of the other bidder. A bidder has a vertical toehold when he owns
a fraction of the capital of the seller. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the only
asset of the seller is the good for sale. Thus, we can identify the seller with his good. For a
bidder, owning a vertical toehold is equivalent to possessing a fraction of the good for sale.
We focus on two polar cases regarding distribution of toeholds.14
• Vertical toeholds: Both ﬁrms own an identical fraction α ∈ (0, 1
2) of the capital of the
seller and no horizontal toehold.
• Horizontal toeholds: Each ﬁrm owns an identical fraction θ ∈ (0, 1
2) of the capital of
the other ﬁrm and no vertical toehold.
In both cases, toeholds are common knowledge.
We consider two diﬀerent auction formats: The second price auction and the ﬁrst price
auction deﬁned as follows. In both auctions, each bidder simultaneously submits a bid b ≥ 0
and the bidder who submits the highest bid obtains the good. In the ﬁrst price auction, the
winner pays the amount of his bid. In the second price auction, he pays the second highest
bid which coincides here with the bid of his opponent. In both auctions, if bidders submit
exactly the same bid, the seller ﬂips a fair coin. The winner obtains the good and pays the
common bid.
In the vertical toehold case, we suppose that the loser always accepts to sell his fraction
of the good at the price deﬁned by the auction.15 Bidder i owns a fraction α of the good.
Then, if he wins the auction, he buys the remaining (1−α) shares of the good. On the other
hand, if he loses the auction, bidder i sells his toehold. Utilities are then deﬁned as follows.
If i obtains the good and pays a price p:
Ui = vi − p + αp
all the studies on the perspectives of the telecom sector by the major consulting ﬁrms
14In both cases, we assume that bidders are symmetric. It is a necessary condition to solve equilibria.
15Consider, for instance, a contested takeover. In that case, a losing competitor usually prefers not to
keep his toehold. If the other bidder takes the control of the target ﬁrm, he will probably divert the extra
proﬁts he can create. The loser is better oﬀ selling his shares before this dilution. On the other side, the
winning bidder, in most legislations, cannot refuse to buy his adversary’s toehold at the price of the winning
tender. Besides, if we interpret toeholds as a fraction of the capital of the seller owned by bidders, through
his shares, a bidder always gets a fraction α of the extra proﬁt of the selling company : αp. The losing
bidder gets αp and the winning bidder gets v − p + αp = v − (1 − αp).
6If j obtains the good and pays a price p:
Ui = αp
.
Denoting by qk the probability that bidder k obtains the good and pk the expected
payment of bidder k, the expected utility of bidder i can be written:
Ui = qivi − pi + α(pi + pj).
The horizontal toehold case is slightly more complex. We assume that through dividends
or the rise of shares’ value, any additional proﬁt of a ﬁrm goes to its shareholders in propor-
tion to their stakes. If bidder i wins the auction and pays a price p, ﬁrm i derives a direct
proﬁt from this purchase: vi−p. Consequently, the value of a fraction θ of ﬁrm i increases by
θ(vi−p). Since ﬁrm j owns a fraction θ of ﬁrm i, whenever ﬁrm i wins at the price p, ﬁrm j’s
value increases by θ(vi−p). But, ﬁrm i also owns a fraction θ of ﬁrm j. Then, because of the
increase of ﬁrm j’s value, ﬁrm i’s value now increases by θ2(vi −p). This mechanism contin-
ues ad inﬁnitum so that the total increase of ﬁrm i’s value is Σ∞
k=0(θ2)k(vi−p) = 1
1−θ2(vi−p).
We also obtain that the total increase of ﬁrm j’s value is Σ∞
k=0θ(θ2)k(vi − p) = θ
1−θ2(vi − p).
Consequently, the total increase of ﬁrm i’s value if bidder j buys the good for a price p is
Σ∞
k=0θ(θ2)k(vj − p) = θ
1−θ2(vj − p).
Up to a rescaling of payoﬀs,16 utility functions can be deﬁned as follows.















(qivi − pi + θ(qjvj − pj))
Notice that an horizontal toehold cannot be modelled as a negative vertical toehold.
There is a speciﬁc element that does not appear in the vertical toehold case. Here, a losing
bidder not only cares about the price paid by the loser, as in the vertical toehold case. He
also cares about the valuation for the good of the winning bidder. That is why these two
16We multiply the former expressions by (1 − θ). With such a normalization, ∀i = 1,2, if bidder i wins
the auction, whatever the price paid, p, is, Ui + Uj + p = vi.
7types of toeholds cannot be represented by a unique coeﬃcient whose sign would be positive
for a vertical toehold and negative for an horizontal toehold.
In both the ﬁrst price and the second price auction and for vertical and horizontal toe-
holds, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
3 Auctions with vertical toeholds
In this section, we consider the setting with vertical toeholds. Bidders own a fraction of the
seller or a fraction of the good for sale. We present the equilibria of the two auction formats,
compare expected revenues and study the properties of this framework.
Most of the proofs are in the appendix.
3.1 Equilibria Characterization
Proposition 1 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction. For













Proposition 2 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the ﬁrst price auction. For













Corollary 1 Both auction formats are eﬃcient. Except if vi = 1 or 0, bidding functions
are strictly increasing in α and so are the actual and expected revenues.
Proof: Eﬃciency derives from the symmetry of the equilibria and the fact that bII
V and
bI
V are strictly increasing functions of vi. The rest is a direct consequence of proposition 1
and proposition 2. Q.E.D.
In both auction formats, we derive a unique symmetric equilibrium in which bidding
functions are increasing in the size of the toehold. The expected price also increases with
the size of the toehold and the allocation is eﬃcient. These proprieties are shared by both
auction formats. However, vertical toeholds aﬀect bidding behaviors in the two auction
formats through two diﬀerent channels that we will now describe.
Let us consider the second price auction ﬁrst. Bidders care about the price paid, p, even
if they fail to obtain the good since they receive αp in that case. Therefore, contrary to
the standard case without toeholds, bidding its own valuation is not a dominant strategy.
8Bidders tend to bid more than their valuations to raise the price, conditional on losing the
auction. On the other side, bidding too high is dangerous. In doing so, a bidder can win
and pay a price above his valuation for the good. The equilibrium bid is the result of this
trade-oﬀ.
For higher values of α, the motivation for raising bids increases since bidders receive
a larger fraction of the price paid conditional on losing the auction. Besides, even if a
bidder wins he only buys a fraction (1 − α) of the good. The higher α is, the lower the
risk conditional on winning the auction. These two elements go in the same direction and
equilibrium bidding functions are strictly increasing in α (except for v = 1).
In the ﬁrst price auction, losing bids have no eﬀects on the price paid by the winner.
There is no direct strategic way for the loser to raise the price paid by the winner. The choice
of a bid only ﬁxes the probability of winning and the price paid conditional on winning the
auction. However, toeholds have an impact on bidders’ incentives, even in a ﬁrst price
auction.
Each bidder wears two hats: A buyer hat and a seller hat. If he wins, he is the buyer of
a fraction (1 − α) of the good. If he loses, he is the seller of a fraction α of the good. As
a potential buyer, a bidder, if he bids ε more and wins the auction, does not pay ε more
but rather (1 − α)ε more. Therefore, conditional on winning the auction, bidding more is
less costly than without toehold. As a potential seller, the expected utility of bidder i, if he







is strictly increasing in d. By increasing his bid, a bidder reduces his probability to sell his
toehold for a low price.
For higher values of α, bidders have two reasons to increase their bids. First, if they lose
the auction, they sell a bigger fraction of the good. Thus, it is even more important not
to sell for too low a price. Second, if they win, since they buy a smaller fraction (1 − α)
of the good, paying a higher price is less costly. As a result, in the ﬁrst price auction also,
equilibrium bids increase in α.
Now, let us reconsider bidders’ strategies in the second price auction. Bidders submit
bids above their valuations. As a result, bidder i can win the auction and buy the good for
a price strictly above his valuation. It happens whenever vi < bII(vj) < bII(vi). Bidder i
wins the auction and pays a price bII(vj) that is strictly higher than his valuation. As this
arises because of his toehold, we say that bidder i is victim of the owner’s curse.18 Since the
bidder only buys a fraction (1−α) of the good, he does not always derive a negative utility.
However, for some realizations, he may actually derive a strictly negative utility ex post.19
17At the equilibrium, bj, the bidding function of j, is a strictly increasing function of vj.
18This expression is due to Singh (1998). He used it to describe the same phenomenon in the asymmetric
case, with only one bidder owning a toehold.
19As in the winner’s curse case, the ex-post negative utility is only a possibility. For any vi and α, the
expected utility of bidder i is always strictly positive.
9The following example illustrate this issue.
Example 1 Suppose that F is a uniform distribution, α = 1
5 and (v1,v2) = (0, 1
10). At the
equilibrium, bidder 2 wins the auction, the price is bII(0) = 1





6 = − 1
30.
This owner’s curse only appears in second price auctions since in the ﬁrst price auction
bidders always submit less than their valuations. This seems to indicate that the second
price auction strengthens more competition than the ﬁrst price auction does. This intuition
is conﬁrmed by the following proposition which establishes the non equivalence in terms of
revenue between the two auction formats.
3.2 Revenue Comparison
Proposition 3 For any α ∈ (0, 1
2), the expected price is strictly higher with a second price
auction than with a ﬁrst price auction.
This result only superﬁcially contradicts the Equivalence Revenue Theorem. Myerson’s
Theorem says that for the revenues of two auction formats to be equivalent: (i) The same
allocation rule must arise in the two formats. This is clearly met in the present context.
(ii) The reservation utility obtained by the lowest bidder must be the same in both auction
formats. As the analysis above shows it, this is not so in the present context. The reservation
utility is strictly higher with the ﬁrst price auction. As a result, the expected revenue is lower
with the ﬁrst price auction than with the second price auction.
Now, let us propose an intuitive explanation for this revenue ranking. In the second
price auction, bidders have a more immediate reason to raise their bids. It is a direct
way to increase the price conditional on their losing the auction. By the very deﬁnition of
auction formats, this motivation cannot appear in a ﬁrst price auction. That is why vertical
toeholds aﬀect more directly bidding strategies in the second price auction than in the ﬁrst
price auction. As a result, the expected price is higher with the second price auction. This
format is more sensitive to vertical toeholds.
We established what is the preferred format for the seller. We may also consider bidders’
preferences regarding auction formats.
Corollary 2 For any α ∈ (0, 1
2), i = 1,2 and vi ∈ [0,1], the expected utility of bidder i
with a ﬁrst price auction is higher than his expected utility with a second price auction by an






α − α + F(t) − (1 − α)F(t)
1
1−αdt > 0
10Proof: The expected utility of a bidder, whatever his valuation is, is a function of the
allocation plus his reservation utility (Revenue Equivalence Theorem). Here, the allocation
rule is the same with both auction formats. Therefore, whatever vi, for bidder i, the diﬀerence
between his expected utility in the two auction formats is the same, equal to what we compute
for vi = 0. Q.E.D.
This uniformity result, although it relies on standard regularity properties, is not so
intuitive. It means that the preference of a bidder for an auction format over another one
depends on α, the size of his toehold but not on his valuation. The use of a ﬁrst price
auction rather than a second price auction is worth a ﬁxed amount to a bidder which does
not change with his valuation. If a bidder has a high valuation and he is almost sure to
win, the extra utility that he derives from the choice of a ﬁrst price auction rather than a
second price auction is the same as when he has a low valuation and he is almost sure to
lose the auction. In the ﬁrst case, he gets an extra utility because he pays a lower price. In
the second case, he gets an extra utility because his opponent pays a higher price. Corollary
2 tells us that the two eﬀects perfectly compensate for each other.
Now, for α = 1
2, bidders’ expected utilities are identical with both auction formats since
for any x ∈ [0,1], −(1 − x)
1




1−α = 0 whenever α = 1
2.20 In fact, this case
corresponds to the partnership problem studied by Cramton and al (1987) showing that the
ﬁrst price and the second price auction is equivalent. Besides, it is a well-known result that
in the standard case, for α = 0, bidders’ expected utilities are the same with both auction
formats. From these results, we derive the following remark.
Remark 1 For any i = 1,2 and vi ∈ [0,1], the diﬀerence between bidder i’s expected utility
with a ﬁrst price auction and his expected utility with a second price auction is a non-
monotonic function of α.
For low values of α, toeholds do not aﬀect much bidding strategies. Thus, the diﬀerences
between the two auction formats are minor. For high values of α, close to 1
2, the auction
tends to be equivalent to the allocation of a good between his two exclusive owners. In that
case, expected utilities uniquely depend on the allocation rule. Since, with both auction
formats, the allocation is the same, expected utilities of bidders are also identical with both
auction formats. Thus, the choice of an auction format or of the other really matters for
bidders only for intermediary values of α.
3.3 Using vertical toeholds to raise the seller’s revenue
We observed that the presence of vertical toehold raises the expected price paid by the
winning buyer, with both the ﬁrst price and the second price auction. Therefore, we may
20All the former proofs remain true for α = 1
2.
11wonder whether giving shares away to the bidders could be proﬁtable for the seller. Can the
rise in the price due to the existence of vertical toeholds overrules the cost of giving shares
to the bidders?
Let us be more speciﬁc. Of course, giving shares away cannot be part of an optimal
selling mechanism (as deﬁned by Myerson (1981) or Riley and Samuelson (1981)). However,
we intend to see if giving shares to the bidders can raise the seller’s revenue in a restricted
framework in which the seller could only use standard auction formats without entry cost and
reserve price (i.e. the good is always sold). We can establish some results in this restricted
framework.
First of all, when bidders are ex-ante symmetric (identical distribution functions for their
valuations), even though vertical toeholds increase the expected price, the seller cannot
increase his expected revenue by giving shares away to the bidders. This result is stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If both bidders have the same distribution function for their valuations, sat-
isfying the monotone hazard rate condition and no vertical toeholds, the seller cannot increase
his expected revenue by giving shares to the bidders. This is true with both the ﬁrst price and
the second price auction.
Starting from the standard symmetric case, the seller cannot use shares’ distribution to
raise his revenue. Now, if bidders’ valuations distribution functions diﬀer, this result does
not stand any more and the seller can increase his revenue by giving shares away. This can
be shown with a simple example.
Example 2 Suppose that F1 is a uniform distribution function on [0,1/2] and F2 is a uni-
form distribution function on [0,1]. We consider the second price auction.
Without vertical toeholds, the expected revenue for the seller, equal to the expected price,
in the unique equilibrium with undominated strategy (i.e. : bidders submit their valuations
for the good) is equal to 5
24 ' 0.2083.
Suppose that the seller gives 20% of the good to bidder 1. Then, there is a unique equi-
librium with undominated strategies : bidder 1 submit
1+5v1
6 and bidder 2 submits v2. If
this equilibrium is played, the expected price reached by the auction is equal to : 257
864 and the
expected revenue for the seller is : (4
5)(257
864) ' 0.238.
The seller can increases his revenue by giving away a fraction of the sale revenue to one
of the bidders. In this example, his revenue rises by approximatively 15%.
The best way to get the intuition of these two seemingly opposite results is to think in
terms of optimal auction format (with a myersonean perspective). It is a well-known result
that, in order to maximize his expected revenue, a seller must choose an auction which
12allocates the good to the bidder with the highest marginal revenue21 (the marginal revenue
of a bidder with valuation v and distribution function F is : v −
1−F(v)
f(v) ).
When bidders are symmetric with a distribution function satisfying the monotone hazard
rate condition, the bidder with the highest valuation has the highest marginal revenue. A
second price auction already allocates the good to the bidder with the highest valuation.
Therefore, there is no need to use vertical toeholds in order to ”improve” the allocation.
When bidders’ distribution functions are not identical, the highest marginal revenue and
the highest valuation may not coincide. For instance, in example 2, when bidders have the
same valuation, bidder 1 has a strictly higher marginal revenue than bidder 2. Therefore
a revenue maximizing mechanism should favor bidder 1 and give him the good in some
conﬁgurations in which he has a lower valuation than bidder 2. By giving shares to bidder
1, the seller distorts the way the second price auction allocates the good in this direction.
Bidder 1 increases his bids and obtains the good with a higher probability. Giving a vertical
toehold makes the allocation closer to the revenue maximizing allocation and raises the
expected price reached by the auction. Example 2 shows that this eﬀect can counterbalance
the loss of a fraction of the sale’s revenue22 so that the expected revenue may rise.
4 Auctions with horizontal toeholds
In this section, we study the horizontal toeholds case. Two bidders with cross-shareholdings
compete in an auction process. We ﬁrst characterize the symmetric equilibria, then we
compare the generated revenues, we also introduce an optimal auction format and extend
the results to the n > 2 bidders case.
With horizontal toeholds, incentives are completely opposite to what we have observed
with vertical toeholds. If bidder i loses the auction, he has nothing to sell to the winner. In
contrast, as he owns a fraction of ﬁrm j, he prefers that ﬁrm j makes the highest possible
proﬁt. He prefers the price to be low.
Thus, for reasons symmetric to those evoked in the case of vertical toeholds, at the
equilibrium, bidders submit lower bids than in the standard case. The following propositions
show precisely in which way horizontal toeholds aﬀect the equilibrium bidding functions of
the two auction formats.
21When the highest marginal revenue is negative, the seller is better of keeping the good. But this is not
possible in the restricted framework we consider.
22By giving shares away to a bidder.
134.1 Equilibria Characterization
Proposition 5 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction. For













Proposition 6 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the ﬁrst price auction. For












Corollary 3 Both auction formats are eﬃcient. Except if vi = 0, bidding functions are
strictly decreasing in θ and so are the actual and expected revenues.
Proof: Eﬃciency derives from the symmetry of the equilibria and the fact that bII
H and
bI
H are strictly increasing functions of vi. The rest is a direct consequence of proposition 5
and proposition 6. Q.E.D.
Both auction formats are eﬃcient. Equilibrium bids are decreasing functions of θ. This
result is not surprising, but it raises an issue concerning competition regulation. Let us
illustrate our point quoting the Commission of the European Communities. In a 1990 report
(Case N◦IV/M.0004 (1990)), it explained that a shareholdings exchange of 25% between two
competitors need not be controlled by the competition authority provided that the exchange
“does not in itself either give sole control of one party over the other or create a situation of
common control”(in application of Council Regulation N◦ 4064/89, article 3). Here, even if
no common decision is taken, crossholdings distort bidders’ behaviors and aﬀect the price.
Therefore, such an exchange, because of its possible consequences, should also be controlled
by the authorities in charge of market regulation. This point was already established in the
context of a Cournot model (see Reynolds and Snapp (1986)). We showed that it remains
true with both the ﬁrst price auction and the second price auction.
Now, let us be more explicit about how crossholdings aﬀect the two auction formats.
In the second price auction, bidding its own valuation is not a dominant strategy. Bidder
i, if he submits a bid bi and fails to win the auction, derives a utility, θ
1+θ(vj − bi) which
is decreasing in bi. Thus, bidders tend to bid less than their valuations. Nevertheless, an
extremely low bid cannot be part of an equilibrium bidding strategy. As a matter of fact,
if bidder i was bidding that way, for some values of vi, he would leave the good to bidder j
for a low price while he would be better oﬀ bidding just a little bit more and obtaining the
good. Bidding strategies, in the second price auction, are the result of this trade-oﬀ. As θ
grows, bidder i gets back a bigger fraction of bidder j’s proﬁt. Thus, it becomes more and
14more important for bidder i, conditional on losing, to submit a low bid. That is why the
equilibrium bidding function is decreasing in θ.
In the ﬁrst price auction, losing bids do not ﬁx the price. Nevertheless, toeholds still
aﬀect bidders’ strategies. As a matter of fact, if a bidder does not obtain the good, his
utility is the proﬁt of the other bidder multiplied by θ
1+θ and not zero. Losing is not as
negative an event as it is in the absence of toehold. The equilibrium bidding function which
is the result of a trade-oﬀ between the fear to lose and the will to make a higher proﬁt when
obtaining the good is consequently aﬀected. Ceteris paribus, the expected utility of bidder
i, conditional on losing the auction, is increasing in θ. For larger values of θ, bidders are less
eager to win the auction with a small diﬀerence between their valuations and their bids. As
a result, equilibrium bidding functions are decreasing in θ.
Thus, through two diﬀerent channels, in both auction formats, vertical toeholds have a
decreasing eﬀect on the bids. We may also ask whether, as in the vertical toehold case, there
is a general ranking in terms of expected revenue between the two auction formats.
4.2 Revenue Comparison
Proposition 7 For any θ ∈ (0, 1
2), the expected price is strictly higher with a ﬁrst price
auction than with a second price auction.
As in the former section, we observe that the equivalence in terms of allocation, even in
an independent private value framework, is not suﬃcient to derive the revenue equivalence
of the two auction formats. Here also, reservation utilities diﬀer. A bidder with valuation
zero strictly prefers the second price auction in which he bids zero and the actual price paid
by the other bidder is zero. Therefore, the expected revenue is lower with a second price
auction.
Even though the revenue ranking is opposite, the intuition of this result is similar to the
intuition in the vertical toehold case. As a matter of fact, as in the vertical toehold case,
a losing bidder can more directly inﬂuence the price in the second price auction. Thus, the
downwards variations of expected revenue due to horizontal toeholds are exacerbated in the
second price auction.
Finally, in the case of horizontal toeholds, a seller should be well advised to choose a ﬁrst
price auction in order to generate more revenue.
We established what is the preferred format for the seller. We may also consider bidders’
preferences regarding auction formats.
Corollary 4 For any θ ∈ (0, 1
2), i = 1,2 and vi ∈ [0,1], the expected utility of bidder i
with a second price auction is higher than his expected utility with a ﬁrst price auction by an














Proof: From the Equivalence Revenue Theorem we derive that in any auction mecha-
nism, the expected utility of a bidder is a function of the allocation rule and his valuation
plus his reservation utility. Here, the allocation is the same with both auction formats.
Therefore, whatever vi, for bidder i, the diﬀerence between his expected utility in the two
auction formats is the same, equal to what we computed in zero. Q.E.D.
Bidders’ preferences for an auction format over another one depends on θ, the size of
the toehold but not on their valuations. The use of a second price auction rather than a
ﬁrst price auction is worth a ﬁxed amount to a bidder. This amount does not change with
his valuation. For low valuations, bidders prefer the second price auction mainly because it
reduces the price paid conditional on losing. For high values, they prefer the second price
auction because it reduces the price he pays, if he wins. Corollary 4 tells us that the two
eﬀects perfectly compensate for each other.
4.3 The optimal auction format
We compared the expected revenue of the standard auction formats in presence of horizon-
tal toeholds. A complementary approach would consist in deﬁning the expected revenue
maximizing (optimal) auction format23.
It is a well-known result that a revenue maximizing auction must be such that the bidder
with the highest marginal revenue24 provided that this marginal revenue is positive and
bidders’ reservation utility is equal to zero. In the standard case, with symmetric distribution
functions and without toeholds, an ascending auction with a reserve price R∗ such that
R∗ =
1−F(R∗)
f(R∗) has these two properties.
When bidders have horizontal toeholds, this is no longer the case. A bidder reservation
is not zero, it is equal to the share of the winning ﬁrm proﬁt that he will obtain through
the toeholds. Therefore, to maximize the seller’s revenue, we must ﬁnd a way to reduce
this reservation utility. This can be done by setting a pre-auction round in which bidders
would be asked to pay their reservation utilities. The seller would commit not to sell the
good if one of the bidders refuses to pay this ”organization fee”. A pre-auction round with
organization fee works as follows.
23The optimal auction format with vertical toeholds has already been deﬁned in Goeree et al (2005). That
is why we did not introduce it in the previous section. Our deﬁnition of the optimal auction format is
inspired by their work.
24We suppose that distribution functions satisﬁes the monotone hazard rate condition so that the marginal
revenu is increasing in v.
16Step 1 : The seller asks all the bidders to pay him an organization fee, c. If one of the
bidder refuses to pay, the auction process ends up and the good is not sold. Otherwise, the
auction process goes on.
Between step 1 and 2, if all the bidders accepted to pay, they pay c to the seller.
Step 2 : If all the bidders paid the organization fee, the seller proceeds with the auction25.
We can build an optimal auction format using this type of pre-auction round26.
Proposition 8 Consider a second price auction with reserve price R such that R =
1−F(R)
f(R)




has a unique symmetric equilibrium with undominated strategies in which bidders participate
with a strictly positive probability. In step 1, both bidders accept to pay the organization fee
whatever their valuations are. In step 2, a bidder i does not make a submission if vi < R






θ if vi ≥ R.
Proposition 9 There is no allocation mechanism in which buyers have a positive reservation
utility that gives a strictly higher expected revenue to the seller than the auction format
described in proposition 8.
We saw that a key element that makes the auction with horizontal toeholds diﬀerent
from a standard auction is the strictly positive reservation utility of the bidders. With the
organization fee, the seller can ﬁx the reservation utility to any positive level, zero being the
best choice for him. Therefore, it is always possible to build an optimal auction with the
help of this organization fee. We built an optimal auction based on a second price auction,
it could have been done as well with a ﬁrst price auction and a diﬀerent (lower) value for
the organization fee. As long as the seller can credibly commit not to sell the good if one of
the bidders refuses to pay the organization fee, he can build a revenue maximizing auction
based on any standard auction format.
4.4 Extension to the n bidders case
We derived all our results in an environment with 2 bidders which seems more plausible
in the case of horizontal toeholds. However, we may wonder whether these results can be
extended to a wider framework with more than two bidders. In fact, we intend to show that
the revenue ranking of the auction formats remains true with n > 2 bidders. To do so, we
consider the following framework.
There are n bidders, with n ≥ 2. Each bidder i has a valuation drawn from an inde-
pendent distribution function Fi. All the Fi are identical, equal to F which satisﬁes the
25The details of the auction format are given to the sellers before the beginning of step 1.
26We assume that bidders have lexicographic preferences, if it does not aﬀect their expected proﬁt, they
strictly prefer the good to be sold.
17monotone hazard rate condition. Each bidder i owns a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1
n−1) of the capital
of all his opponents. If we deﬁne qk as the probability that bidder k wins the auction and
pk the expected payment from bidder k to the seller, then the preferences of bidder i can be
represented by the following utility function :27
Ui =
1 + (2 − n)θ
1 + (3 − n)θ
(qivi − pi) +
θ




As in the case with 2 bidders, we can identify the unique symmetric equilibrium with
both auction formats.
Proposition 10 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction. For













Proposition 11 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the ﬁrst price auction. For













Whatever the number of bidder is, there always exists a symmetric and eﬃcient equi-
librium with both auction formats. We can also establish that the ranking of the auction
formats (in terms of expected price) remains the same independently from the number of
bidders
Proposition 12 For any n ≥ 2 and for any θ ∈ (0, 1
n−1), the expected price is strictly higher
with a ﬁrst price auction than with a second price auction.
This proposition shows that the results we obtained do not depend on the number of
bidders. They remain true with n > 2 bidders.
27Let h(θ,n), be the fraction of an extra proﬁt of ﬁrm k 6= i that ﬁrm i gets depending on θ and n. If ﬁrm
k receives 1 Euro, all the other ﬁrms get h(θ,n) Euro and ﬁrm k gets 1 + θ(n − 1)h(θ,n) Euro. The value
of all the ﬁrms raises by : 1 + (1 + θ)(n − 1)h(θ,n). Since we suppose that any extra proﬁt is distributed
to the shareholders through dividends, none of the ﬁrm keeps any money from this Euro. This means
that the amount of the dividends given to the ”other shareholders”, those who do not have crossholdings
is equal to 1. This can be written as follows : (1 − (n − 1)θ)(1 + (1 + θ)(n − 1)h(θ,n)) = 1 which gives
h(θ,n) = θ
(1+θ)(1−(n−1)θ) and 1 + θ(n − 1)h(θ,n) =
1+(2−n)θ






In the presence of cross-shareholdings, we showed that an expected revenue maximizer seller
is always better oﬀ choosing a ﬁrst price auction. We can apply this result, for instance, to
the RVI/Volvo Trucks case that we presented in the introduction. We derive that for the
clients of RVI and Volvo Trucks, among the standard auction formats, the ﬁrst price auction
was the best choice in order to strengthen the competition among them and to avoid as
much as possible the negative eﬀects of crossholdings.28
When bidders own a share of the seller or a fraction of the good for sale, the expected
revenue is higher with the second price auction than with the ﬁrst price auction. If we apply
this result to the Global One case, we derive that a second price auction was more in favor of
Sprint, the seller and a ﬁrst price auction was more in favor of France T´ el´ ecom and Deutsche
Telekom, the buyers.
We may also notice that, in that case, it is not obvious that the seller was the one who
chose the auction format. As a matter of fact, the two possible buyers owned 80% of Global
One while, the seller owned only 20% of Global One. Therefore, it is unclear who really
controlled the agenda.
This remark suggests a natural extension to this work. It would consist in modelling
a pre-auction bargaining about the choice of the auction procedure. This may be treated
in future work. For the time being, we can make the following remark. We established in
corollary 2 that bidders’ preferences for an auction format over another one do not depend
on their valuations. Then, without going more into the details of this pre-auction bargaining,
we can say that it will not allow to directly extract information about bidders’ valuations29.
We can also give a broader interpretation of these results. As a matter of fact, losing
bidders may care about the ﬁnal price in many other situations. We could analyze such
situations with our model: α and θ would be, respectively, the coeﬃcient of mutual malevo-
lence and the coeﬃcient of mutual benevolence among bidders. With this interpretation, we
could extend the application ﬁeld of our results. We would derive the following. In order to
beneﬁt more from the eﬀects of mutual malevolence among bidders, a seller should choose
the second price auction. On the other side, to protect himself from mutual benevolence
among bidders, he should choose a ﬁrst price auction.
This interpretation is reminiscent of some insights of the existing auction theory litera-
ture, although there exists no general study of this issue. Let us give two examples. First,
the collusion situation. In that case, we may consider that bidders are mutually benevolent.
It has been shown that collusion is much easier to sustain with a second price auction than
28As far as we know, the format that was eﬀectively used was close to a ﬁrst price auction. A priori, it
was not chosen because of the considerations we studied.
29Contrary to what de Frutos and Kittsteiner (2006) derive in a partnership dissolution environment, here,
the choice of the auction format does not aﬀect the allocation, it only aﬀects the surplus distribution
19with a ﬁrst price auction (see Robinson (1985) on this issue). Second, budget-constrained
bidders in two sequential auctions. In the ﬁrst item auction, the losing bidder prefers that
the winning bidder pays a high price. If he spends more in the ﬁrst auction, this winning
bidder will be a less dangerous opponent in the following auction. Thus, we can talk of
mutual malevolence in the ﬁrst auction. Pitchik and Schotter (1988) studied that case, fo-
cusing on the revenue of the ﬁrst auction. They showed that the ﬁrst price auction raises a
lower revenue than the second price auction, in the ﬁrst item auction, both in theory and in
practice.
In these two examples, the revenue ranking follows the same general logic as the one
we observed in our model. In the benevolent (resp: malevolent) case, a ﬁrst price auction
(resp: second price auction) generates more revenue.30 This tends to show that the results
we found should be applicable, more generally, to situations in which a seller has to deal
with mutual benevolence or mutual malevolence among bidders. Proving this intuition will
be the object of future research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 1
As a ﬁrst step, we must show that any symmetric equilibrium bidding function of the second
price auction, b must satisfy the following conditions: b is continuous in the interval [0,1),
strictly increasing in the interval [0,1] and lim
v→1−b(v) = 1.31
First, let us prove that b is nondecreasing: If v < v, then b(v) < b(v) is impossible.
As a matter of fact, as b(v) is a best response for a bidder with valuation v, a bidder with
valuation v can proﬁtably deviate by submitting b(v) rather than b(v) < b(v). Thus, b must
be nondecreasing. We can also exclude the possibility that b has an atom (an interval of
valuations for which bidder i submits the same bid). As a matter of fact, it is impossible
that, an interval of types, bidder 2 prefers to quit simultaneously with bidder 1’s atom rather
than leave just before or just after.
Now, let us show that b must be continuous on [0,1). Suppose that b has a gap in
v∗ ∈ (0,1). Since bidders strictly prefer to sell their shares for the highest possible price
and b is strictly increasing, there always exist an ε > 0 such that a bidder with valuation






2 rather than b(v∗ −ε) which means that
b is not constitutive of a symmetric equilibrium. Thus, b must be continuous on (0,1). The
30We would not obtain such results if we assumed that losing bidders derive a ﬁxed externality that only
depends on the identity of the loser. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) showed that, in that case, there is no such
revenue ranking. The revenue ranking relies on bidders caring about the price paid by the winner.
31At the equilibrium, the exact value of b(1) has no importance provided that b(1) ≥ 1. For the sake of
simplicity, we will consider that b(1) = 1.
20continuity in 0 can be proved the same way.
Finally, suppose that lim
v→1−b(v) 6= 1. As bidding less than his valuation is a dominated
strategy, we must have lim
v→1−b(v) > 1. Since b is increasing, we also have 1 < lim
v→1−b(v) ≤ b(1).
However, if a bidder has a valuation 1 for the good, he strictly prefers that his opponent
wins the auction for a price 1 rather than buying the good for a price exceeding 1. Thus, a
bidder whose valuation for the good is 1 would be strictly better oﬀ bidding 1 than b(1) > 1.
We obtain a contradiction, therefore, lim
v→1−b(v) = 1.
Now, consider a bidding function b respecting these conditions. If bidder j bids according
to b, it is a dominated strategy for bidder i to bid less than b(0) and he cannot be better
oﬀ bidding more than b(1) than he would be bidding b(1). Thus, we can restrict bidder
i’s strategy to the choice of a g : [0,1] → [0,1], such that he bids b(g(vi)). Let us deﬁne
UII
i (vi,b vi) as the expected utility of bidder i with valuation vi bidding b(b vi). As we can limit
our study to the case b vi ∈ [0,1], we obtain the following expression
U
II
i (vi,b vi) =
Z b vi
0









= 0 for b vi = vi,for vi ∈ [0,1]
This can be written:33
vif(vi) − b(vi)f(vi) + α(1 − F(vi))b
0(vi) = 0 (1)
































32We can exclude corner solutions.
33We assume that b
0
is well deﬁned on the considered interval, a condition that is veriﬁed at the equilibrium.
21Integrating by parts, we obtain
−b(vi)(1 − F(vi))
1



















6.2 Proof of proposition 2
The reasoning is the same as for the proof of proposition 1. For the same reasons, b is
continuous and strictly increasing. As it is a dominated strategy for a bidder to bid more
than his valuation, we derive b(0) = 0 (which replaces the limit condition lim
v→1−b(v) = 1).








The equivalent of expressions (A.1) and (A.2) are
vif(vi) − b(vi)f(vi) − (1 − α)F(vi)b





















And with transformations identical to these of the proof of proposition 1, we obtain










6.3 Proof of proposition 3
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem says that the revenue of an auction is a function of
the allocation rule minus bidders’ reservation utilities of bidders. In the present case, the
22allocation is identical with both auction formats. Thus, in order to compare the expected
revenues of these two auction formats, we can focus on the comparison of expected utility
of lowest type, v = 0.























































































































As h(x) = −(1 − x)
1




1−α > 0,34 for x ∈ (0,1),α ∈ (0, 1
2), SV is strictly
negative. The reservation utility is higher with a ﬁrst price auction than with a second price
auction. Therefore, the expected revenue of the second price auction is higher than the
expected revenue of the ﬁrst price auction. Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of proposition4
It is a well-known result that in the class of mechanism which always allocates the good,
an expected revenue maximizing mechanism must satisfy the two following properties : 1)
34This can be demonstrated showing that ∀α ∈ (0, 1
2), h(x) on the considered interval is convex then
concave and convex. Besides h(0) = h(1) = 0 and h0(0) ≥ 0,h0(1) ≤ 0, ∀α ∈ (0, 1
2).
23The good must be allocated to the bidder with the highest marginal revenue and 2) Bidders’
reservation utility must be equal to zero.
When bidders have the same distribution function for their valuations satisfying the
monotone hazard rate condition and no vertical toeholds, both the ﬁrst price and the second
price auction satisfy these properties. Therefore, they are constrained35 revenue maximizing
auction format and the seller cannot increase his expected by giving shares away. In fact,
he could only reduce its expected revenue by giving shares since he cannot ”improve” the
allocation rule and he would raise bidders’ reservation utility. Q.E.D.
6.5 Proof of proposition 5
Once more, the reasoning of the proof is the same as for the proof of proposition 1. All the
ﬁrst part is equivalent, we can directly study the expected utility
U
II






(vi − b(t))f(t)dt + θ
Z 1
b vi
(t − b(b vi))f(t)dt)




= 0 for b vi = vi,∀vi ∈ [0,1]
This can be written:37





As b(0) = 0, the solution of the diﬀerential equation is










Integrating by parts, we obtain










35Constrained because we restrict our attention to auction mechanisms which always allocate the good;
36We can exclude corner solutions.
37We assume that b
0
is well deﬁned on the considered interval, a condition that is veriﬁed at the equilibrium.
246.6 Proof of proposition 6




i (vi,b vi) =
1
1 + θ




The ﬁrst-order condition is


























Integrating by parts, we obtain









6.7 Proof of proposition 7
As in the proof of proposition 3, we can use the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. The allo-
cation is the same with the ﬁrst price auction and the second price auction. Therefore, we
directly focus on the reservation utilities comparison.
























θ > 0 and
R 1
0 bI
H(t)f(t)dt > 0, then the reservation utility is strictly higher with the
second price auction than with the ﬁrst price auction. As a result, the expected revenue is
higher with the ﬁrst price auction than with the second price auction. Q.E.D.
256.8 Proof of proposition 8
First, for any v and v such that 0 ≤ v < v ≤ 1, if at the equilibrium, a bidder with valuation
v accepts to pay the organization fee, then he also accepts to pay it when his valuation is
v (because, by participating he can get at least what he would get if he were to participate
with a valuation v). Then, the strategy of bidder i in the ﬁrst step can be represented
by a threshold (for a valuation below this threshold, a bidder does not accept to pay the
organization fee and, for a valuation above this threshold he accepts to pay the organization
fee). Let us call this threshold v∗.
Suppose that v∗ ∈ [R,1)38, then we can show that, in the second step, bidders would
submit bids increasing with their valuations and higher than R. Now, bidder i with valuation
0 would be better oﬀ accepting to pay the organization fee in step 1 than refusing. If he
refuses, his utility is zero. If he accepts, either bidder j refuses and bidder i gets zero or
bidder j also accepts. If bidder j accepts, in step 2, bidder i can submit 0. Bidder j wins the












R(t − R)f(t)dt)) which is strictly positive since v∗ ≥ R > 0.
Then v∗ ∈ [R,1) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose that v∗ ∈ (0,R). Bidder i with valuation v∗ pays the organization fee and he
has a dominant strategy in the auction : not to participate. His expected utility is at least
equal to zero (otherwise, he would be better oﬀ not paying the organization fee). Now if
bidder i has a valuation b v strictly lower than v∗, he can also pay the organization fee, not
participate in the auction and obtain the same positive expected utility (which he prefers to
a situation in which the good would remain unsold because of his lexicographic preferences).
Therefore, v∗ ∈ (0,R) cannot be part of an equilibrium either.
Now, suppose that v∗ = 0. In the auction itself, a bidder with valuation strictly lower
than R has a dominants strategy : not to participate in the auction. If there exists a bidding
function, b, such that, at the symmetric equilibrium, a bidder with valuation b v ≥ R submits
b(b v) ≥ R with b strictly increasing, it must be such that (following the proof of proposition
5):





As b(R) = R, the solution of the diﬀerential equation is









We need to check that with such a bidding strategy in step 2, it is an equilibrium for
the bidders always to pay the organization fee in step 1. To do so, we only need to check
38Note that if v∗ = 1, bidders participate in the auction with a probability zero. We excluded this kind of
equilibrium.
26that a bidder with a valuation v = 0 is better oﬀ paying the organization fee. If he pays, his





























This is equal to zero and a bidder with valuation zero prefers paying the organization fee
because of his lexicographic preferences.
Q.E.D.
6.9 Proof of proposition 9
It is a well known result that an auction is optimal if and only if it allocates the good to the
bidder with the highest marginal revenue (provided that this marginal revenue is positive)
and bidders’ reservation utility is equal to zero.
Since we assumed that the distribution function satisﬁes the monotone hazard rate con-
dition, the marginal revenue of a bidder is strictly increasing with his valuation and positive
when v ≥ v∗ with v∗ such that v∗ =
1−F(v∗)
f(v∗) .
The reserve price of the auction is precisely equal to v∗ and the equilibrium of the auction
is such that the bidder with the highest valuation above v∗ wins the auction. Then, the
allocation of the auction coincides with the optimal allocation rule.
Now, we need to check bidders’ reservation valuation. A bidder with a valuation equal
to zero pays the organization fee equal to θ
1+θ
R 1
R(t−R)f(t)dt and derives an expected proﬁt
from the sale of the good equal to θ
1+θ(
R 1
R(t − R)f(t)dt − θ
1+θ
R 1
R(t − R)f(t)dt). Therefore,




































which is equal to 0.
Q.E.D.
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n−2dt + θ(n − 1)
Z 1
b vi
(t − b(b vi))f(t)F
n−2dt








Which gives the following diﬀerential equation :
(vi − b(vi))f(vi) −
θ
1 + (1 − n)θ
(1 − F(vi))b
0(vi) = 0
As b(0) = 0, the solution of the diﬀerential equation is










6.11 Proof of proposition 11
We apply the same arguments as in the proof of proposition 6 and directly study the expres-
sion
(1 + (2 − n)θ)(F





The ﬁrst-order condition is
vif(vi) − b(vi)f(vi) −
1 + (2 − n)θ
(n − 1)(1 + (1 − n)θ)
F(vi)b
0(vi) = 0
As b(0) = 0, the solution of the diﬀerential equation is










6.12 Proof of Proposition 12
We prove the proposition by induction.
Note that we already established this proposition for n = 2. Now, suppose that it is
veriﬁed for n = e n ≥ 2 for any value of θ ∈ (0; 1
e n−1). Let us consider the case with e n + 1
bidders and any b θ ∈ (0, 1
e n).
28First, let us observe that since b θ < 1
e n, there always exists a θ0 < 1
e n−1 such that
b θ
1+(1−e n)b θ =
θ0
1+(2−e n)θ0. In a second price auction, bidders make the same equilibrium submissions when
there are e n bidders and a toehold of size θ0 or when there are e n+1 bidders and a toehold of
size b θ. In a ﬁrst price auction, bidders make higher equilibrium submissions when there are
e n + 1 bidders and a toehold of size b θ or when there are e n bidders and a toehold of size θ0.
Since, with both auctions, the allocation is the same (i.e. the bidder with the highest
valuation wins the auction), we just need to compare reservation utility. The reservation
utility is equal to b θ times the expected utility of the bidder with the highest valuation
conditional on one bidder having a valuation equal to zero. In a second price auction, this is
equal to the expected utility of the bidder with the highest valuation, with e n bidders and a
toehold of size θ0 (we will denote it : EU
II
(θ0,e n)). In a second price auction, this is less than
the expected utility of the bidder with the highest valuation, with e n bidders and a toehold
of size θ0 (we will denote it : EU
I
(θ0,e n)).
With e n bidders, whatever the size of the toehold is (strictly positive), the expected price
paid is strictly higher with a ﬁrst price auction than with a second price auction and the
allocation is the same. Therefore, since the allocation is the same with both auction formats,
whatever his valuation is, the expected utility of a bidder is strictly higher with a second
price than with a ﬁrst price auction. Then EU
II
(θ0,e n) > EU
I
(θ0,e n). This means that, with
e n+1 bidders and a toehold of size b θ, the reservation utility is strictly higher in a second-price
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